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Dangerous Patients:
An Exception to the Federal
Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege
BY HUSTON COMBS*
INTRODUCTION
n 2000, the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Hayes' declined to
establish a dangerous patient exception to the federal psycho-
therapist-patient privilege in criminal prosecutions. Coupled with the
psychotherapist's duty to warn, as first recognized in Tarasoff v. Regents
of the University of California2 and now adopted in a majority of states,3
this holding leads to the seemingly paradoxical result of requiring a
psychotherapist to warn third parties of potential violence while excluding
from evidence in criminal proceedings all psychotherapist-patient
privileged communications.
As in Hayes, privileged communications may be the only evidence of
a criminal offense.4 Suppressing the confidential communications may
therefore effectively guarantee summary judgment for the defendant during
prosecution for unrealized threats. Likewise, if a patient asserts the
psychotherapist-patient privilege during prosecution for a committed act of
violence, suppression of privileged patient communication greatly thwarts
* J.D. expected 2003, University of Kentucky.
'United States v. Hayes, 227 F.3d 578 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that there is no
dangerous patient exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege under FED. R.
EVID. 501).
2 Tarasoffv. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 529 P.2d 553 (Cal. 1974) (holding
that a psychotherapist has the duty to use reasonable care to give threatened
persons such warnings as are essential to avert foreseeable danger arising from his
patient's condition or treatment).
' See George C. Harris, The Dangerous Patient Exception to the Psycho-
therapist-Patient Privilege: The TarasoffDuty and the Jaffee Footnote, 74 WASH.
L. REv. 33, 47 (1999).
4 The grand jury indictment in Hayes was based on three counts of statements
by Hayes to psychotherapists threatening the life of a federal official. Hayes, 227
F.3d at 581.
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prosecution. Despite recognizing these possibilities, the Hayes holding5 and
the psychotherapist-patient privilege itself are premised on the overriding
value that certain confidentiality plays in successful psychotherapy.6 The
psychotherapist-patient privilege is based on the underlying idea that the
societal benefit of a mentally healthy populace outweighs the occasional
loss of evidence in federal proceedings.' The holding in Hayes implies that,
in weighing competing interests, a dangerous patient exception does not tip
the balance in favor of an evidentiary exception.
The most common situation justifying a dangerous patient exception
to the privilege occurs when the admissibility of privileged communications
in criminal proceedings is necessary to avert harm to a third party. The
Tenth Circuit, one of three circuits of the United States Courts of Appeals
to consider the dangerous patient exception, developed the "necessary to
avert harm" exception in United States v. Glass. The Ninth Circuit recently
adopted this exception and its underlying rationale as well.9 Although other
possible circumstances arguably justify exception, such as when the
psychotherapist informs his or her patient in advance that communications
will not be confidential,' I the Tenth Circuit held that the "necessary to avert
harm" exception is the only instance where the testimony offered outweighs
the benefit of the exception in the balancing framework that first estab-
lished the privilege." Despite this distinction, the Sixth Circuit denied a
5 The majority in Hayes notes that "recognition of a 'dangerous patient'
exception surely would have a deleterious effect on the 'atmosphere of confidence
and trust' in the psychotherapist/patient relationship." Id. at 584.
6 E.g., Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10 (1996) ("Like the spousal and
attorney-client privileges, the psychotherapist-patient privilege is 'rooted in the
imperative need for confidence and trust."' (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445
U.S. 40, 51 (1980))).
7 See id. at 11-12.
8 United States v. Glass, 133 F.3d 1356 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that the
psychotherapist-patient privilege should be broken if necessary to avert a serious
threat of harm to a third party).
9 United States v. Chase, 301 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir 2002) (holding that a
dangerous patient exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege applies when
a threat of harm is serious and imminent and when the harm can be averted only by
means of disclosure by the therapist).
'0 See Hayes, 227 F.3d at 587 (Boggs, J., dissenting) ("[W]hen the social
worker has specifically informed the patient that the social worker will not keep the
communications confidential, there is no barrier to that person testifying....").
11 See Glass, 133 F.3d at 1356. See also Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 9-10 ("[T]he
question we address today is whether a privilege protecting confidential communi-
cations between a psychotherapist and [his or ] her patient 'promotes sufficiently
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petition for a rehearing en banc, 2 and the opinion split between the federal
courts remains.
This Note contends that the strict law announced by the Sixth Circuit
in United States v. Hayes fails to accommodate certain circumstances
justifying a dangerous patient exception to the psychotherapist-patient
privilege. Part I of this Note explores the history of the psychotherapist-
patient privilege by outlining its development and by examining its formal
recognition by the United States Supreme Court in Jaffee v. Redmond. 3 In
addition, Part I examines the exceptions to the privilege that federal courts
have adopted since the Jaffee decision. 4 Part H outlines the rationale
behind the Tarasoffdecision and examines state decisions reconciling the
duty to protect with the evidentiary psychotherapist-patient privilege." Part
MII explores the facts and the judicial reasoning in both the Hayes and Glass
cases and illustrates the differences between their holdings. 6 Finally, the
Note concludes that the Hayes holding fails to accommodate the possibili-
ties to which the Jaffee court refers.
I. THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE
A. History
In 1972 the United States Supreme Court, acting on the recommenda-
tion of the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on the Rules of
Evidence, submitted to Congress nine proposed testimonial privileges.,7
These proposed privileges were included in nine separate rules, including
the psychotherapist-patient privilege in Proposed Rule 504.1 Historically,
the Supreme Court has recognized a testimonial privilege only where such
privilege facilitates a private good based on the inherent need for confi-
dence.' 9 The privilege must also promote a public good that transcends the
important interests to outweigh the need for probative evidence .... ") (quoting
Trammel, 445 U.S. at 51).
" United State v. Hayes, No. 98-6623,2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 34097, at * 1 (6th
Cir. Dec. 12, 2000).
13 See infra notes 18-49 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 50-76 and accompanying text.
's See infra notes 77-92 and accompanying text.
"6See infra notes 93-128 and accompanying text.
" See Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and Magistrates, 56
F.R.D. 183, 240 (1972) [hereinafter Proposed Rules].
'sJaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9 n.7 (1996).
'9 See id. at 10.
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predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining the
truth.20 Thus, inherent in a Supreme Court recommendation of the
psychotherapist-patient privilege is the Court's belief that confidentiality
in psychotherapy would benefit both the patient and the public despite the
evidentiary loss to society.
Congress ultimately rejected the nine specific privileges in favor of a
single, open rule that left the development of the privileges to the federal
courts.2' This rule, Federal Rule of Evidence 501, states that, absent acts of
Congress or rules of the Supreme Court, privileges are "governed by the
principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of
the United States in the light of reason and experience."22 The Senate
Judiciary Committee stated, however, that "in approving this general rule
as to privileges, the action of Congress should not be understood as
disapproving any recognition of a psychiatrist-patient.., privilege.... 23
Despite widespread agreement that confidentiality is requisite for
successful psychiatric treatment, the psychotherapist-patient privilege
described in Proposed Rule 504 contained three specific exceptions:
communications relevant to proceedings for hospitalization of patient,
statements made during an examination by judicial order, and communica-
tions relevant to the condition of the patient when that condition is an
element of the claim or defense.2" The drafters created these exceptions
after determining that in each circumstance the public need for evidence
outweighs the need for confidentiality in successful psychotherapy."
Missing from these exceptions is one regarding dangerous patients;
however, the drafters intentionally excluded such an exception.26
The Advisory Committee believed that patients who willingly
expressed to psychotherapists their intention to commit crime were unlikely
to commit the crime and were instead making a plea for help. 7 If the pleas
were subject to disclosure, the patient would fear the consequences of
disclosure and would therefore deprive the psychotherapist of the
20 See id. at 9.
21 See FED. R. EVID. 501.
22 id.
23 S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 13 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051,
7059.
24 See Proposed Rules, 56 F.R.D. at 241.
25 See id. at 243-44 (citing Abraham S. Goldstein & Jay Katz, Psychiatrist-
Patient Privilege: The GAP Proposal and the Connecticut Statute, 36 CONN. B.J.
175 (1962)).
26 SeeGoldstein & Katz, supra note 25, at 188.
27 See id.
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opportunity to offer help to the patient.28 Ultimately, the drafters believed
that more crime would be prevented if patients could disclose their criminal
intentions than if communications were used against the patient in a
criminal proceeding. 29 By intentionally excluding an exception for
dangerous patients, the Advisory Committee showed great deference to the
principle that the success of a psychotherapist depends upon his or her
ability to communicate freely with a patient in a confidential setting.
By leaving the development of the psychotherapist-patient privilege to
the lower federal courts, Congress left room for disparate treatment of the
privilege. In fact, some Appellate Courts did not initially recognize the
privilege;30 this disparity was not resolved until the Supreme Court formally
recognized the privilege in 1996.31 Even in jurisdictions that recognized the
privilege, differences arose as to its scope, leaving without answers
questions such as under what circumstances is the privilege justified, and
what are the boundaries of the term "psychotherapist?"
B. Jaffee v. Redmond
In 1996, the United States Supreme Court squarely faced the question
of whether the advantages of protecting confidential communications
between a psychotherapist and his or her patient outweigh the need for
evidence.32 Given that Rule 501 recognizes privileges "governed by the
principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of
the United States in the light of reason and experience,"33 the Supreme
Court in Jaffee was greatly influenced by the fact that all fifty states
adopted some form of the psychotherapist-patient privilege.34 In addition,
the Court reasoned that "any State's promise of confidentiality would have
little value" if federal courts could ignore that promise.35 Ultimately, the
28 id.
29 See Harris, supra note 3, at 62 ("[T]he drafters of Proposed Rule 504 assumed
'that less harm will ensue if patients feel free to ventilate their intentions.' ").
30 E.g., United States v. Corona, 849 F.2d 562, 567 (11 th Cir. 1988) (holding
that no psychotherapist-patient privilege exists in federal criminal trials); United
States v. Meagher, 531 F.2d 752, 753 (5th Cir. 1976) (failing to recognize a
psychotherapist-patient privilege because such privilege did not exist at common
law).
" Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996).
32 See id. at 9-10.
33 FED. R. EVID. 501.
14 See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 14.
351Id. at 13.
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decision to recognize the psychotherapist-patient privilege relied upon the
same conclusion reached by the states: "[e]ffective psychotherapy...
depends upon an atmosphere of confidence and trust in which the patient
is willing to make a frank and complete discourse of facts, emotions,
memories, and fears."36 The privilege was limited to "confidential
communications between a licensed psychotherapist and [his or] her
patients [made] in the course of diagnosis or treatment."37
In the decision on appeal in Jaffee, the Seventh Circuit had adopted a
fact-specific balancing test to determine whether the psychotherapist-
patient privilege applied to a given situation.3" Under the Seventh Circuit's
analysis, the privacy interests of the individual were measured against the
evidentiary need for the disclosure.39 The Supreme Court categorically
denied the balancing test in favor of a firm psychotherapist-patient
privilege. The Court believed that a case-by-case analysis would effectively
thwart the public and private interests served by the privilege.40 The Court
compared the psychotherapist-patient privilege to the spousal and attorney-
client privileges by noting that all are "'rooted in the imperative need for
confidence and trust.' ,
4'
The Court reasoned that protecting psychotherapist-patient communica-
tions engenders productive confidence between the psychotherapist and
patient and that this confidence in turn facilitates effective psychotherapy.42
Increasing the mental health of the individual through effective psychother-
apy in turn benefits the "mental health of our citizenry."43 This public value
of a citizenry of sound mental health was critical in the Court's analysis.
Finally, the Court noted that the "mere possibility of disclosure may impede
development of the confidential relationship necessary for successful
treatment."" Thus, the public andprivate benefits of psychotherapy depend
on confidentiality between the therapist and his or her patient.
361d. at 10, 13.
371Id. at 15.
38 Jaffee v. Redmond, 51 F.3d 1346, 1357 (7th Cir. 1995), aff'd, 518 U.S. 1
(1996).
39 See id. at 1357 ("[W]e will determine the appropriate scope of the privilege
'by balancing the interests protected by shielding the evidence sought with those
advanced by disclosure.' ") (quoting In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632, 640 (1983)).
40 See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 17.
4' Id. at 10 (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980)).
42 Id. at 11 ("The psychotherapist privilege serves the public interest by
facilitating the provision of appropriate treatment for individuals suffering the
effects of a mental or emotional problem.").43Id.
"Id. at 10.
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Despite rejecting a balancing test in favor of a general privilege, the
Supreme Court did not fully define its scope. The Court found it "neither
necessary nor feasible to delineate [the] full contours [of the
psychotherapist-patient privilege] in a way that would 'govern all
conceivable future questions in this area."" Importantly, the Court, in
dicta ("the Jaffee Footnote"), recognized that there were situations in which
the privilege would yield to the interests of justice:
Although it would be premature to speculate about most future develop-
ments in the federal psychotherapist privilege, we do not doubt that there
are situations in which the privilege must give way, for example, if a
serious threat of harm to the patient or to others can be averted only by
means of a disclosure by the therapist.
46
Should the privilege apply in all circumstances? The Court essentially left
this development to the lower courts but noted that an" 'uncertain privilege
... is little better than no privilege at all.' "A7
Although the Jaffee Court did not define the scope of situational
applicability, the Court narrowed the scope of the privilege in other ways.
Importantly, social workers were included in the psychotherapist definition
along with psychiatrists and psychologists. 48 In addition, the privilege only
applies when made "in the course of diagnosis or treatment" by a licensed
psychotherapist.49 Thus, with certain limits prescribed by the Supreme
Court, the Jaffee decision left the lower federal courts with the ability to set
the ultimate parameters on the application of the privilege. This discretion
was guided by the overriding principle of the public and private benefits
that result from confidential psychotherapy.
C. Federally Recognized Exceptions to the Psychotherapist-Patient
Privilege
1. Patient-Litigant Exception
It is clear that the Advisory Committee that drafted Proposed Rule 504,
with its three exceptions, contemplated the psychotherapist-patient
' Id. at 18 (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 386 n.19
(1981)).
4Id. at 18 n.19.471Id. at 18 (quoting Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 393).
48Id. at 15.
49 Id.
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privilege giving way to evidentiary needs.5° Language in Jaffe also
illustrates this expectation. By stating in dicta that the psychotherapist-
patient privilege undoubtedly gives way in particular circumstances, the
Supreme Court in Jaffee -essentially reestablished a certain balancing
element into the privilege.5' Balancing should enable courts to make
exceptions to the general rule and should be used to acknowledge recurrent
situations that demand special treatment; however, there are myriad
situations in which this need might occur.
The first common exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege is
the "patient-litigant" exception, under which the patient cannot claim the
privilege if the defense or claim is based on his or her "mental or emotional
condition."52 The patient-litigant exception is in fact more of a waiver than
an exception. Many courts have held that solely by placing one's mental or
emotional state at issue, a patient waives the privilege. 3 Under this
interpretation, the waiver occurs regardless of whether the parties intend to
introduce evidence of mental state.
54
Other jurisdictions have taken a narrower approach, holding that the
privilege is only waived if the patient "does not call as a witness a person
who has provided [him or] her with psychotherapy, and does not introduce
into evidence the substance of any communication with such a person."55
Jurisdictions adopting this test have analogized the psychotherapist-patient
privilege to the attorney-client privilege.56 As a result, logic demands that
the patient-litigant exception should occur in parallel situations where the
attorney-client privilege is waived, namely when the attorney's advice is at
issue. The Jaffee Court equated the fundamental purposes- of the
psychotherapist-patient privilege with the attorney-client privilege.57 This
approach taken by the lower courts seems more in line with the Supreme
Court's reasoning. The solid, established privilege is necessary for the
individual and the public to benefit from psychotherapy; however, in
50 See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 18 n.19.
51 See id.
52 Melissa L. Nelken, The Limits of the Privilege: The Developing Scope of
Federal Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege Law, 20 REv. LrnlG. 1, 20 (2000).53 See, e.g., Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Danka Indus., Inc., 990
F. Supp. 1138, 1142 (E.D. Mo. 1997) (using a broad interpretation of the patient-
litigant exception).
14 See Nelken, supra note 52, at 21.
" See, e.g., Vanderbilt v. Town of Chilmark, 174 F.R.D. 225, 230 (D. Mass.
1997).
61 Id. at 229-30.
57 See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10 (1996).
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predictable, recurrent situations, the privilege should yield, much as the
attorney-client privilege yields, in parallel situations.
2. Crime-Fraud Exception
The First Circuit has also examined whether there should be a crime-
fraud exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege similar to that
recognized under the attorney-client privilege.5" Such an exception was
recognized by the First Circuit in In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Gregory
P. Violette),59 where the court ruled to enforce grand jury subpoenas for
psychiatrists whose testimony was sought in an investigation for fraudulent
disability claims by the defendant.' The proceedings were based on the
government's belief that Gregory Violette made false statements concern-
-ing his psychiatric condition to financial institutions in exchange for loans
and disability insurance.6" Violette, intervened to assert a crime-fraud
exception to the federal psychotherapist-patient privilege, a question of first
impression among the federal courts.62
In holding that a crime-fraud exception applies to the psychotherapist-
patient privilege, the First Circuit analogized the crime-fraud exception to
the attorney-client privilege. 63 For the crime-fraud exception to the
attorney-client privilege, the First Circuit noted that the "balance shifts...
when a client communicates for the purpose of advancing a criminal or
fraudulent enterprise."'  This holding does not imply that protecting
criminal and fraudulent communication has no potential value because
attorneys are in a position to discourage unlawful activity. 65 The crime-
fraud exception, however, rests on the principle that preventing crime and
fraud can better be served through admitting evidence into the judicial
system than through the attorney's counseling.66
After reviewing Jaffee's reliance on the attorney-client privilege to
create the psychotherapistpatient privilege, the First Circuit logically
58 See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Gregory P. Violette), 183 F.3d 71 (1 st Cir.
1999).
59 Id.
60 Id. at 72.
61 1d.
62 Id. at 74 (noting that no court since Jaffee has determined whether the privi-
lege is subject to a crime-fraud exception).63I d. at 75-77.
64Id. at 76.
65 Id.
66 id.
2002-2003]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
carried the crime-fraud exception to the psychotherapist setting. The court
reasoned that the "mental health benefits, if any, of protecting such
communications pale in comparison to'the normally predominant principle
of utilizing all rational means of ascertaining truth."' 67 In fact, the First
Circuit determined that there were few situations in which legitimate
mental health communications and communications regarding crime or
fraud could simultaneously exist.6" Situations where potential harm arises
from protecting the information, however, are quite possible, as the case at
bar illustrates.69
The rationale for the exception rested on the idea that communications
in the furtherance of fraud lack the therapeutic nature that the privilege
seeks to protect. The court, however, did limit the exception to cases where
the "patient's purpose is to promote a particular crime or fraud." As a
result, a criminal's confession of a past robbery would not justify use of the
exception.70 Thus, the justifications, exceptions, and even the applicability
of psychotherapist-patient privilege parallel the attorney-client privilege.
3. Other Potential Exceptions
One potential exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege that has
been rejected by the federal courts rests on a defendant's right to compul-
sory process."1 In United States v. Doyle,72 the defendant subpoenaed the
records of the psychotherapist who treated the victim of the crime. The
victim suffered extreme psychological harm and the government sought an
augmented sentence based on the federal sentencing guidelines.73 The court
drew analogies to the spousal and attorney-client privileges in rejecting
such an exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege.74 Although the
communications might help the defendant's cause under the facts, revealing
the communications would involve a fact-specific balancing test, which is
exactly what the Jaffee Court disliked.75 In ruling that Sixth Amendment
67Id. at 77 (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980) (quoting
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting))).61 Id. at 77.
69See id. at 71.
7°1d. at 77.
71 See Nelken, supra note 52, at 39.72 United States v. Doyle, 1 F. Supp. 2d 1187 (D. Or. 1998).
73 Id. at 1189.
74 1d. at 1189-90.
71 See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 17 (1996) ("We reject the balancing
component of the privilege implemented by [the Court of Appeals] and a small
number of States.").
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rights of the defendant do not overcome the psychotherapist-patient
privilege, the court adhered to the importance of a firm privilege as
espoused in Jaffee.76
II. THE TARASOFF DUTY TO WARN
The now widely recognized duty of a psychotherapist to protect third
parties from potential threats was first recognized by the Supreme Court of
California in Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California." The
underlying facts involved a psychotherapist who became convinced that his
patient, Prosenjit Poddar, posed a violent threat to a third party, Tatiana
Tarasoff. Subsequently, Poddar killed Tarasoff.8 The survivors ofTarasoff
then brought a negligence claim based on the psychotherapist's failure to
warn Tarasoff or her parents of the danger Poddar posed.7 9
The original 1974 Tarasoffdecision concerned a duty to warn but was
replaced with the broader duty to protect in the 1976 TarasoffI.80 Both
Tarasoffcases based the duty owed to third parties on the special relation-
ship that exists between the psychotherapist and the patient."1 The
underlying policy is that protecting third parties from foreseeable violence
justifies breaking the confidentiality between the therapist and the patient.
Although the psychotherapist is in a unique position to help the patient and
confidentiality is critical to successful therapy, protecting a third party from
serious harm is imperative. On a simple balancing test, the outcome seems
clearly logical; however, the affirmative duty to warn, created by the
Tarasoff decision, is novel and debatable.
The duty does not arise until the therapist "determines, or pursuant to
the standards of his profession should determine, that his patient presents
a serious danger of violence to another." 2 In order to adhere to the duty of
76 Doyle, 1 F. Supp. 2d at 1190. The Oregon district court quoted from a portion
of Jaffee that extolled the virtues of a predictable privilege. Id.
7 Tarasoffv. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 529 P.2d 553 (Cal. 1974).
78Id. at 554-56.
79Id. at 556. Plaintiffs originally brought four claims: (1) "'Failure to Detain
a Dangerous Patient;" (2) "'Failure to Warn on a Dangerous Patient;" (3)
"'Abandonment on a Dangerous Patient;" and (4) "'Breach of Primary Duty to
Patient and the Public."' The court allowed only the second claim. Id. at 556-65.
80 Tarasoffv. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976) [hereinaf-
ter Tarasoff II].
8' James C. Beck, The Psychotherapist's Duty to Protect Third Parties from
Harm, 11 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 141 (1987).
82 TarasoffII, 551 P.2d at 340.
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care owed to the third party, the therapist must "notify the police, or [] take
whatever other steps are reasonably necessary under the circumstances."83
In notifying another party of the potential threat of violence, therapists
obviously break the seal of confidentiality between themselves and their
patients. Subsequent decisions in other jurisdictions have predominately
focused on two factors: whether the violence was foreseeable and whether
the psychotherapist had sufficient control over the patient.84 In dealing with
these factors, California and most other states recognizing the psychothera-
pist's duty to warn have limited its application to cases where the patient
has made "a serious threat of violence against a reasonably identifiable
victim."85
The psychotherapist's duty to protect has not been the subject of many
cases, and only a handful have involved identifiable third parties.86 As a
result, the judiciary has not spoken to many of the possibilities that might
arise with respect to the TarasofflI duty and has not clearly reconciled the
decision with psychotherapist-patient privilege. The Supreme Court of
California, in California v. Wharton, held that there is no evidentiary
privilege when the criteria for disclosure exist." The California statute
states that "[t]here is no privilege... if the psychotherapist has reasonable
cause to believe that the patient is in such mental or emotional condition as
to be dangerous to himself or to the person or property of another and that
disclosure of the communication is necessary to prevent the threatened
danger."88 The Tarasoff II decision in fact relied upon this exception to
create the duty to protect; the exception to the privilege was "a declaration
of public policy that [psycho]therapist-patient confidentiality must yield in
the face of danger to third parties."8 9
Another state to examine the psychotherapist-patient relationship with
respect to the TarasoffII duty is Oregon.9° The Supreme Court of Oregon
took an alternate approach by holding that the dangerous patient exception
arises when harm can be averted only by means of disclosure at the time of
83 Id.
8 See Beck, supra note 81, at 141.
85 Harris, supra note 3, at 48.
86 See Beck, supra note 81, at 142 ("There are only six cases that, like Tarasoff,
involve outpatients, and only one of these six involved an explicit threat-to a named
victim.").
87 California v. Wharton, 809 P.2d 290, 310-11 (Cal. 1991).
88 CAL. EVID. CODE § 1024 (1991), reprinted in Wharton, 809 P.2d at 306.
89 Harris, supra note 3, at 50.
90 See State v. Miller, 709 P.2d 225 (Or. 1985).
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the proceedings that raise the evidentiary issue.9' In distinguishing the duty
to protect from the evidentiary exception, the court noted:
The public interest to be served by notifying the police, inmost cases,
could be achieved by divulging only that information needed to show why
a clear and immediate danger is believed to exist. It would rarely justify
the full disclosure of the patient's confidences to the police, and never
justify a full disclosure in open court, long after any possible danger has
passed.92
The differences are essentially in timing: under the California decision, the
duty to protect exception arises whenever the TarasoffIlduty arises, while
the Oregon decision makes clear that the exception should be analyzed at
the time of criminal proceedings and only rarely applies. Under the Oregon
decision, if the threat has passed by the time of the evidentiary proceeding,
then the duty to protect exception does not apply. Under the California rule,
however, the exception would apply. These two distinct approaches to
reconciliation of the psychotherapist-patient privilege and the TarasofffI
duty to protect illustrate two ways in which the Jaffee dicta might be
interpreted.
l. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Among the federal appellate courts, only the Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth
Circuits have examined whether a dangerous patient exception to the
federal psychotherapist-patient privilege exists in criminal proceedings.
The Tenth Circuit,93 whose holding was followed by the Ninth Circuit,94
relied upon the Jaffee footnote95 and concluded that such an exception
existed if the otherwise privileged communication would be needed for the
protection of a third party.96 The Sixth Circuit, in United States v. Hayes,
rejected this rule in favor of a privilege immune from a dangerous patient
exception for criminal proceedings. 97
The Hayes decision concerned Roy Lee Hayes, who worked as a union
steward for the United States Post Office in Marion, Virginia. In 1997, he
9' Id. at 236-37.
92Id. at 236.
93 See United States v. Glass, 133 F.3d 1356 (10th Cir. 1998).
" United States v. Chase, 301 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2002).
9' Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18 n.19 (1996).
96 Glass, 133 F.3d at 1360.
9' United States v. Hayes, 227 F.3d 578 (6th Cir. 2000).
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began to behave unpredictably, and often became depressed to the point of
not performing his employment duties.98 The Veterans Administration
Mountain Home Hospital ("MHH") in Johnson City, Tennessee, diagnosed
Hayes as having "major depression accompanied by severe psychotic
features."9 9 In discussions with psychotherapists, Hayes indicated on two
different occasions that he wanted to kill Vera Odle, his supervisor at the
post office. Despite Hayes's violent desires, the psychotherapists at MHH
never warned Odle, and Hayes was released with only a prescription for his
condition.
As his condition failed to improve, in early 1988, Hayes sought the help
of James Van Dyke, a social worker in the Veterans Center in Johnson
City. Hayes gave Van Dyke detailed descriptions of his plan to kill Odle.
Subsequently, Hayes left the Veterans Center after Van Dyke similarly
concluded that Hayes was not dangerous. After experiencing a period of
anxiety and lack of self restraint in late March, Hayes again met with Van
Dyke, making more specific and ominous threats against Odle. After this
session, Van Dyke became wary of possible harm to Odle and of his
potential responsibility for failing to warn Odle. As a result, Van Dyke
informed Odle of Hayes' threats. 0°
Odle's supervisor, Postal Inspector Terrence Vlug, demanded the
records Van Dyke made of his meetings with Hayes.' Vlug then filed a
criminal complaint under 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1),' °2 charging Hayes with
threatening to murder a federal officer. The district court applied the
standard announced in United States v. Glass,"0 3 finding that Hayes'
statements to doctors at MHH and to Van Dyke were privileged. The court
held that the psychotherapist-patient privilege applied to both sets of
statements because revealing Hayes' threats was not "'the only means of
averting harm"' to Odle when Hayes made the threats."°
9 d. at 580.
99 Id.
100Id.
101 Id.
102 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1) provides: "Whoever... threatens to assault, kidnap,
or murder a United States official... with intent to impede, intimidate, or interfere
with such official ... while engaged in the performance of official duties, or with
intent to retaliate against such official... on account of the performance of official
duties, shall be punished ......
103 United States v. Glass, 133 F.3d 1356 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that the
psychotherapist-patient privilege should be abandoned if necessary to avert a
serious threat of harm to a third party).
104 Hayes, 227 F.3d at 581 (quoting Glass, 133 F.3d at 1360).
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Judge Ryan, for a three-judge panel of the Sixth Circuit, affirmed the
district court's dismissal, although on grounds distinct from the district
court. First, in noting that the psychotherapist-patient privilege does not
interfere with a professional duty to protect third parties, the Court properly
acknowledged the distinctions between the dangerous patient exception and
the Tarasoff duty to protect."5 The court found the two concepts to be
distinct and chronologically different because the psychotherapist's duty
to protect arises during the course of psychotherapy, whereas the dangerous
patient exception arises at prosecution.'0 6 Thus, allowing psychotherapist
testimony generally serves only an evidentiary purpose, whereas the duty
to protect serves the public function of protecting the health of third parties.
The psychotherapist's duty to protect requires taking all reasonable steps
to avert harm to third parties, which may or may not include warning a third
party. As the Sixth Circuit noted, if a dangerous patient exception were
triggered upon a psychotherapist's warning to a third party, the testimonial
privilege would depend upon whether a psychotherapist acted reasonably,
which would greatly impede the criminal rights of the defendant.' 7 More
importantly, by the time of trial, the privilege is often broken solely for the
sake of prosecution because the benefit of protecting a third party has
generally vanished. However, this generalization ignores cases where
breaking the privilege for evidentiary purposes is necessary for the
protection of a third party.
There clearly is no compelling reason to break the psychotherapist-
patient privilege for evidentiary reasons related to a past threat that is no
longer material or for evidentiary reasons related to the prosecution of an
executed threat, but situations can arise where "an unrealized threat" can
only be avoided by criminal prosecution. As the Sixth Circuit stated:
[C]ompliance with the professional duty to protect does not imply a duty
to testify against a patient in criminal proceedings or in civil proceedings
other than directly related to the patient's involuntary hospitalization, and
such testimony is privileged and inadmissible if a patient properly asserts
the psychotherapist/patient privilege.'
08
Ultimately, the Sixth Circuit properly recognized that the duty to warn and
the psychotherapist-patient privilege can co-exist, but the holding ignores
1o See id. at 583-84.
106 See id.
o7Id. at 584.
Ios d. at 586.
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certain situations in which a psychotherapist's warning to a third party is
inadequate for the third party's protection.
As the preceding quotation indicates, the Sixth Circuit interpreted the
Jaffee footnote to apply to cases where the protection of the third party
involves a psychotherapist testifying for the involuntary commitment of a
patient. 1°9 Hospitalization would eliminate the serious threat of harm, so
this scenario preserves the benefit of psychiatric care while also protecting
a third party. Allowing psychiatric testimony at a criminal proceeding,
however, would not have the same effect of fostering mental health because
such care is typically not available to one who is incarcerated. The court
reasons that adoption of a federal common law exception would be unwise
because the majority of states recognize no such exception." 0
In dissent, Judge Boggs argued that the psychotherapist-patient
privilege should not "creat[e] a barrier that prevents competent testimony
as to the commission of a crime by a fully warned, patient. . . .""' The
dissent's disagreement with the holding is based on the undisputed fact that
Hayes was repeatedly warned during the course of his psychotherapy that
his threats could not be kept confidential." 2 Under this reasoning, by
continuing with his statements, Hayes impliedly waived his privilege.
Unlike the waiver to the psychotherapist-patient privilege that may occur
when a person claims mental or emotional damages, this supposed waiver
occurs in the course of treatment. Since confidentiality is necessary for
effective treatment, the "waiver" should only be used in situations where
averting third party harm is necessary. This Tarasoff duty to warn is
probably what Hayes' psychotherapists considered when informing him
that threatening statements could not be kept confidential. Using the
statements at criminal proceedings would only be logical when also
necessary to avert harm. Otherwise, the confidentiality upon which
psychotherapy depends would be undermined. In other words, if only a
pure evidentiary reason were used for breaking the privilege, the costs
would outweigh the benefits under a Jaffee balancing test.
Determining what the Supreme Court contemplated in footnote
nineteen of Jaffee is difficult. Consistent with the Sixth Circuit's interpreta-
tion, the footnote can be read narrowly in scope, covering only situations
o Id. at 585.
"o Id. at 585-86.
.Id. at 589.
12 Id. at 588 ("Dr. Radford told Hayes in February, as Hayes himself testified,
that his threats to kill Odle would have to be reported. Van Dyke warned Hayes
twice that his threats would not and could not be kept in.confidence.").
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for hospitalization proceedings." 3 Yet, by stating that an exception to the
privilege would be justified if necessary to avert harm," 4 the Supreme
Court seems to have contemplated more. For instance, in a hearing for a
restraining order, one party might request to have a psychotherapist testify.
A reasonable person might view the restraining order as necessary for
averting harm to a third party in the same way that a criminal prosecution
is necessary to avert harm to a third party. Unlike a hospitalization
proceeding, neither a restraining order nor a criminal conviction would
entail psychotherapy for the defendant; thus, allowing the psychotherapist
to testify would be an exception to the privilege where the underlying
purpose (i.e., the mental health of the citizenry) is completely defeated.
However, using a balancing test, the imminent safety of a third party would
surely outweigh- the corresponding break in the psychotherapist-patient
privilege.
In analyzing whether the dicta in Jaffee created a dangerous patient
exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege, the Hayes court applies
the proper analysis in light of the Jaffee decision: a balancing test of the
private and public benefits of psychotherapy with the public need for
evidence." 5 When stating that the privilege serves a greater public good,
the Supreme Court in Jaffee implicitly stated that the public's need for
evidence would have to justify an exception to the privilege." 6 In most
criminal proceedings, an exception to the privilege would serve only an
evidentiary function. What the Sixth Circuit failed to acknowledge is that
a criminal proceeding may be the only way to protect the interests of a third
party. Because a break in the psychotherapist-patient privilege must be
"necessary to avert harm," all other possible alternatives for avoiding the
harm would have to be exhausted. As the Sixth Circuit notes, involuntary
hospitalization might often provide a solution.' Yet, in rare instances, a
"I Id. at 586.
114 Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18 n.19 (1996).
"5 See Hayes, 227 F.3d at 584.
"6SeeJaffee, 518 U.S. at 15 ("Because we agree with the judgment of the state
legislatures and the Advisory Committee that a psychotherapist-patient privilege
will serve a 'public good transcending the normally predominant principle of
utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth,' we hold that confidential
communications between a licensed psychotherapist and [his or] her patients in the
course of diagnosis or treatment are protected from compelled disclosure under
Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.") (citation omitted).
"I See Hayes, 227 F.3d at 585 ("After involuntary hospitalization, for example,
the patient would no longer pose a 'serious threat of harm' to anyone and,
hopefully, the psychotherapist/patient relationship can continue during the patient's
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criminal proceeding might be the only way to avert harm, and this rare
circumstance would be fact-specific. The rule of law pronounced by the
Sixth Circuit, however, fails to accommodate this possibility by stressing
the societal benefits of confidentiality over potentially imminent harm to
an innocent individual."1 8
The Tenth and Ninth Circuits however, adopted a more liberal reading
and application of the Jaffee footnote. The Tenth Circuit, in United States
v. Glass, considered a situation where the patient threatened to kill the
President and the psychotherapist became concerned when the patient could
not be located for several days." 9 The court remanded the case and
instructed the district court to make a determination concerning whether the
threat was serious when uttered and whether a disclosure was "the only
means to avert harm."'2 ° On remand, the lower court determined that a
dangerous patient exception was necessary to avert harm. A secret service
agent testified that he considered the threat serious because Glass had
previously made such threats and because he had the resources to execute
his plan."'
In United States v. Chase, the Ninth Circuit considered a case in which
a patient stated that he would kill federal officers if they searched his
home.'22 Chase was receiving treatment for "irritability, anger symptoms,
and depression," and during his therapy sessions he often displayed great
volatility toward former business associates. 23 The death threats on which
prosecution was based occurred during a telephone exchange between
Chase and his therapist when Chase was locked in his home and, anticipat-
ing the execution of a search warrant.2 " The Ninth Circuit reasoned that a
dangerous patient exception is "faithful both to the Jaffee footnote and to
the obvious policy considerations that underlie it."' 25 Since the trial court
found that Chase presented imminent danger of causing serious harm to
hospitalization.").
I8 See id. at 584-85 ("Passing for the moment'the question whether the
Supreme Court adopted a 'dangerous patient' exception to the psychothera-
pist/patient privilege in a footnote, we begin by examining the effect such an
exception would have on the 'confidence and trust' that is implicit in the
confidential relationship between therapist and patient.").
" United States v. Glass, 133 F.3d 1356, 1357 (10th Cir. 1998).
'2° Id. at 1360.
121 See Nelken, supra note 52, at 35.
122 United States v. Chase, 301 F.3d 1019, 1022 (9th Cir. 2002).
123 id.
124 1d. at 1022.
'251 d. at 1024.
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others and that his therapist's disclosure to authorities was the only means
of averting that harm, the testimony regarding the threats was properly
admitted by the trial court. 26
Both Glass and Chase illustrate that in some instances imminent harm
may only be avoided by prosecution-warnings and involuntary commit-
ment may not suffice. As common sense dictates, threats are unlikely to
materialize once a criminal proceeding for the threats has begun. The fact
that threats are unlikely to occur after criminal proceedings begin, however,
does not eliminate the possibility. Although the circumstances might be
rare, what the Hayes court ignores is that psychotherapist testimony at a
criminal proceeding might be the only way that harm can be avoided. In the
same light, a magistrate might view a restraining order as the only means
of protecting a third party. Both scenarios would benefit from the logical
application of the dangerous patient exception to the psychotherapist-
patient privilege.
Ultimately, the Hayes Court saw little connection between a psychother-
apist's warning to a third party and lifting the psychotherapist-patient
privilege to allow testimony recounting the threats.'27 The court reasoned
that the duty to warn serves a more immediate goal than a dangerous patient
exception because threats are unlikely to be carried out once criminal
proceedings have begun. But it is still possible to execute threats even after
criminal proceedings have begun, especially when a judgment for the
prosecution is impossible without the necessary evidence.
At the outset, the Hayes court was correct in differentiating the
Tarasoff duty to warn from the dangerous patient exception. 2 Yet, the
Hayes decision ignores a possibility that might arise: a scenario in which
testimony is the only means of averting harm. Although the drafters of
Proposed Rule 504 likewise excluded a dangerous patient exception,
Congress ultimately rejected the rules in favor of a common law approach.
Thus, in light of "experience and reason," there are circumstances where
the protection of a third party depends upon the admissibility of confiden-
tial communications in a criminal proceeding. This is exactly what the
district courts determined in Glass and Chase, the only two federal
opinions exploring the scenario. The "necessary to avert harm" standard
announced in Glass is high and will not often be met. Yet, with a sweeping
rule as was pronounced in Hayes, the benefits of confidential psychother-
'
26 Id. "[I]t was unlikely that Chase would be held for longer than 72 hours due
to his lack of a committable mental illness." Id. at 1025.
127 See United States v. Hayes, 227 F.3d 578, 583-84 (6th Cir. 2000).
128 See id.
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apy will occasionally come at the price of grave harm, or even death, to
innocent third parties.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's footnote in Jaffee, although subject to multiple
interpretations, supports the dangerous patient exception to the
psychotherapist-patient privilege in criminal proceedings, but only when
absolutely necessary to prevent harm. In such situations the breaking of the
privilege goes beyond serving a simple evidentiary need because society is
served with an immediate benefit: the protection of innocent citizens. Due
to the existence of both societal and evidentiary benefits, the Supreme
Court, if reviewing the issue on certiorari, would likely recognize an
exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege in criminal proceedings
where necessary to avert harm to third parties. This exception will arise in
only a few instances, and by infrequently invoking it, the damage done to
the privilege and to-efficacious psychotherapy is minimized. By recogniz-
ing the rare but recurrent situation demanding this dangerous patient
exception to the psychotherapist-privilege, the Supreme Court would be
adhering to its reasoning and balancing approach, similarly used to grant
exceptions to other pivileges, but the creation of the exception would not
be so broad as to consume the benefits of the psychotherapist-patient
privilege.
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